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Introduction
While the 1932-1933 Great Famine in the U.S.S.R. occurred in 
both Ukraine and some regions of Russia, the approaches to investigating 
this crime and to its qualification are absolutely different in modern 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The aim of this paper is to analyze the 
views of Ukrainian and Russian scholars on the legal aspects of the 1932- 
1933 Holodomor in Ukraine and the official positions of both states con­
cerning the Holodomor.
Ukrainian Scholars’ Position
Ukrainian scholars started to actively research the documents and 
evidences on the Holodomor since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, and 
even prior to it during Gorbachev’s perestroika. Since the beginning of 
this research, and especially at the end of 1990s, a majority of Ukrainian 
scholars who investigated the Holodomor characterized it as a crime of 
genocide against the Ukrainian people.
Unfortunately, not many lawyers research the crime o f the Holo­
domor in Ukraine. Among those who are actively writing on the legal is­
sues of the Holodomor is Professor Volodymyr Vasylenko who formulates 
arguments on the Holodomor as genocide directed against Ukrainian na­
tional group thusly: “наявність наміру сталінського тоталітарного
режиму організувати Голодомор в Україні, замаскований під над­
мірні плани хлібозаготівель, і спрямованість проти української нації 
як такої, зокрема проти її вагомої частини — селян. Між україн­
ським Голодомором і голодом, який у  той період охопив інші регіони 
СРСР, існувала якісна різниця: селян поза межами України та Кубані
1 Presented at the 26th Conference on Ukrainian Subjects at the Universi­
ty of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on June 24-27, 2009.
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виморювали голодом як соціальний клас, а українські селяни стали 
жертвами злочину насамперед через свою приналежність до 
української нації, [the reality of the intent of the Holodomor organized by 
Stalin’s totalitarian regime was camouflaged by the immoderate plans for 
grain collection and targeted against the Ukrainian nation as such, espe­
cially against its most populous sector —  the peasants. There was a signif­
icant difference between the Ukrainian Holodomor and the famine that, 
during that same period, had spread through other regions of the USSR: 
the peasants beyond the boundaries of Ukraine and Kuban were starved to 
death as a social class, while the Ukrainian peasants became victims of 
starvation primarily because they were Ukrainian.]”2
Specialists in criminal law in Ukraine are still tracing the ways in 
which the crime of the Holodomor can be prosecuted and punished in 
Ukraine, stressing that it was not a crime under Ukrainian law at the time 
when it was committed. However, the Holodomor was a crime under in­
ternational customary law and constitutes a crime of genocide under the 
“Genocide Convention,” which has no statutory limitations. Both the In­
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 15) and the Eu­
ropean Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (article 7) stress that the norm of “no offence without law” in 
this case is superseded by the norm “nothing shall prejudice the trial and 
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when 
it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by the community o f nations.”
Official Recognition of the Holodomor in Ukraine
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted in 2002 the Decree on 
the 70th Anniversary of the Holodomor in Ukraine, recognizing the Holo­
domor as genocide. The Ukrainian genocide was then recognized by the 
Ukrainian Law “On the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine” on Novem­
ber 28, 2006. Following a request from the World Congress o f Ukrainians, 
the National Commission for Strengthening Democracy and the Rule of 
Law approved a Conclusion, on May 16, 2008, regarding the juridical 
characterization of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine as an act of 
genocide against the Ukrainian people, with regards to the definition for­
mulated in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide adopted in 1948.
2 Володимир А. Василенко, “Голодомор 1932-1933 років в Україні: 
правова оцінка,” Дзеркало тижня (October 4-10, 2008).
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The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine worked actively on 
the international arena while trying to persuade the UNO and the Council 
of Europe, as well as other states, to adopt resolutions recognizing the Ho- 
lodomor as genocide against Ukrainians. Though it was definitely prema­
ture -— the world in its majority is not yet ready to recognize it —  the ef­
fort attracted the world community’s attention to the Ukrainian Holodomor 
and clearly identified who strong-headedly opposed and will oppose this 
recognition. In its 58th session, the UN General Assembly adopted a decla­
ration signed by 64 states on the 70th anniversary of the Holodomor — 
“Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933” —  which described the famine as 
“a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people” that “took 7 to 10 millions of 
innocent lives.”
On November 1, 2007, the 34th Session of the UNESCO General 
Conference, with 193 countries, unanimously passed a Resolution “On 
Remembrance of victims o f Holodomor in Ukraine” on the 75th anniver­
sary of the Holodomor. The Resolution expressed the conviction that the 
tragedy of Holodomor, which was caused by the harsh actions and politi­
cally totalitarian régime under Stalin, should be a warning to present and 
future generations to adhere to democratic values, human rights and legal­
ity. A similar proposal was put forward by Ukraine at the 9th Session of the 
UN Human Rights Council. However, “in view of the fact that the issue of 
the Holodomor was being considered at other world forums, the Ukrainian 
delegation on September 22, in a spirit of compromise, decided not to in­
sist on a vote for the draft resolution by the Council.”3
In January 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe condemned the Holodomor as a crime of the communist régime 
and, in October 2008, the Parliament of the European Union adopted the 
Resolution recognizing the Holodomor in Ukraine as a crime against hu­
manity.
Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko said at a November 2008 
ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the onset of the 1932-1933 fam­
ine that “hunger was selected as a tool to subdue the Ukrainian people.” In 
January 2009, President Yushchenko ordered state archives to declassify, 
publish and study all documents relating to the Holodomor, the Ukrainian 
independence movement, and political repressions during the Soviet pe­
riod from 1917 to 1991. On May 25, 2009, the Security Service of Ukraine 
launched criminal proceedings on charges of arranging the Holodomor in
3 From a statement issued September 26, 2008 by the Press Service of 
Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the 75th anniversary of the Holo­
domor; see khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=1222377444.
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1932-1933 and asked the Federal Security Service of Russia to provide 
documents kept at the archives of Russian special services and help 
Ukraine investigate these criminal proceedings.4
From the 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century, when Ukraine 
started to research and to actively discuss issues of the Holodomor, the 
Australian, Argentinean, Georgian, Estonian, Italian, Canadian, Lithua­
nian, Polish, American, and Hungarian parliaments (as well as those of 
other countries) adopted resolutions or legislation condemning the Holo­
domor. Thus, the Australian Senate adopted a Resolution on October 30, 
2002 which stated that the Holodomor was one of the genocides in the his­
tory of mankind.5 The Seim of Lithuania adopted a resolution on Novem­
ber 24, 2005 which states that “Stalin’s totalitarian régime committed a 
conscious and thoroughly planned genocide against the Ukrainian 
people.”6 Furthermore, the Georgian parliament recognized the Holodo­
mor as genocide against the Ukrainian people committed by the totalitarian 
Bolshevik regime in 1932-1933.7
Russia’s Approaches to the Great Famine
Russia, under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, also started to ac­
tively research the problems of the 1932-1933 famine and other crimes of 
the Soviet totalitarian system in Russia. One such example was the Katyn 
case opened by the Procurator General Office of the Russian Federation. 
However, after democracy was curtailed in Russia, the trends in investigat­
ing and especially in assessing the famine in Russia, and in the former So­
viet Union in general, changed to absolute non-acceptance of recognition 
of Ukraine’s Holodomor as genocide. It naturally led to a decrease in re­
search on the famine. Ukraine’s genocide claim is hotly contested by Rus­
sia, which insists that the famine indiscriminately affected many ethnic 
groups across the Soviet Union. While this is so to an extent, it was only in 
Ukraine and in the Northern Caucasus (Kuban), predominantly inhabited 
by ethnic Ukrainians (and to some extent in Kazakhstan8) that it was orga­
nized with the intent to eliminate peasants on the national ground: the
4 “Ukraine asks Russia for Holodomor archives,” Kyiv Post, vol. 11, is­
sue 33 (June 4, 2009).
5“Австралія визнала Голодомор геноцидом,” За нашу Україну, по. 45 
(July 7, 2003).
6 “Литва визнала Голодомор в Україні геноцидом,” Голос України, 
по. 225 (November 26, 2005), р. 6.
7 “Це був геноцид,” Голос України, по. 2 (January 5, 2006), р. 1.
8 The issue of the Kazakhstan famine is not dealt with in this article.
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harvest in Ukraine, though less than in previous years, was enough to feed 
the people. Stanislav Kosior, the head of the Communist Party in Soviet 
Ukraine, stated in a summer 1930 memo “саме щодо українських селян” 
[pertaining to Ukrainian peasants]: “The farmers have adopted a new tac­
tic. They want the grain to rot, in order to strangle Soviet rule with the 
bony hand of starvation. But the enemy has miscalculated. We will show 
them what a famine really is. You are ordered to collect everything, to the 
last grain, and immediately deliver it to the procurement stations.”9
Recently Russia issued a DVD and a thick book o f historical 
documents to dispute claims that the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s 
amounted to genocide.10 1They include letters portraying the dire situation 
at that time in what is now Russia and in other ex-Soviet republics and 
orders —  some with Stalin’s stamped signature in red ink —  denying pleas 
for relief in grain procurement quotas. Other documents suggest officials 
in Ukraine misled Moscow about the extent of hunger there."
Russian archivists and historians pressed the Kremlin’s case that 
the Stalin-era famine —  which killed millions of people —  was a common 
tragedy across Soviet farmlands, countering efforts by Ukraine’s pro- 
Western president (former President Yushchenko) to convince the world 
that Ukrainians were targeted for starvation.12 13
Much as in the 1930s, when the word “famine” was treated as anti­
soviet agitation,1’ the Russian government still treats the word Holodomor 
as anti-Russian propaganda. The Russian Duma in 2008 passed a resolution 
that firmly rejected recognizing the famine in Ukraine as genocide. When 
President Yushchenko organized a 75th-anniversary commemoration in No­
vember 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev refused to attend it, ac­
cusing his Ukrainian counterpart in an open letter of “ [using] the so-called 
‘Holodomor’ ... to achieve short-term political goals.”
There exist different explanations of Russia’s behavior concerning 
the Great Famine in general and the Ukrainian Holodomor in particular. 
As Peter Borisow writes: “Russia has changed only its tactics, not its ulti­
mate goal of solving its ‘Ukrainian problem.’ Russia continues its work to
9 From the exhibit “Holodomor: Genocide by Famine” (June 2009, Uni­
versity of Illinois Library).
10 O. A. Antipova (ed.), Golod v SSSR: 1930-1934 gg (Moscow: Federal- 
noe arkhivnoe agentstvo, 2009).
11 The Ukraine List, no. 432 (June 17, 2009), item 11.
12 “Russia: Deadly 1930s famine not genocide. Denies that Ukrainians 
were targeted for starvation during Stalin era,” at msnbc.msn.com/ id/29391949.
13 P. О Медведев, Сталине и сталинизме (Moscow, 1990), р. 212.
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eliminate all that defines Ukrainians as a people and as a nation in order to 
return Ukraine once and for all to regional status within Russia. ... Noth­
ing stands in Russia’s way more than the Holodomor. How can Russia pre­
tend to be a respected world leader, a caring and responsible steward of its 
people with all that blood on its hands? This is a case of Lady Macbeth in 
reverse —  the world sees the blood, while Russia actually believes that 
after seventy-five years of denial, rewriting history, repression and de­
struction o f evidence, it has washed away the blood and is now magically 
pure as a newborn baby’s soul. ... while the Holodomor marked the height 
of Russian genocide against Ukrainians, it was by no means an isolated 
event. Under Russian rule, Ukrainians were subjected to tyranny that went 
beyond traditional interpretations of genocide, to what this author terms 
‘metagenocide’ —  ‘long term ongoing genocide systematically targeting 
for destruction not just a group o f people but also all that defines them as 
that group. The goal is not just to deny the group’s right to exist, but to 
deny that it ever existed as a nation in the first place, to wipe it from hu­
manity’s collective memory’.”14
It combined the worst aspects of classic genocide with long term 
intentional ethnocide. Russia’s metagenocide in Ukraine targeted not only 
Ukrainian persons, but also the Ukrainian language, culture, history, 
churches, traditions and all else that contributes to defining Ukrainians as 
Ukrainians and not as just another subset o f Russians.15
As was mentioned above, the topic of the famine is not widely 
analyzed by Russian scholars. Still, among those scholars who do write 
about the Famine, one can identify three different approaches, and conse­
quently Russian sources on the Famine-Holodomor may be divided into 
three categories:
1. Denial of the Holodomor within the political context o f a new 
Ukrainian nationalist policy.
2. Denial that its consequences were so crucial, stressing the ex­
aggerated conclusions of Ukrainian scholars on the Holodo­
mor and denying the genocidal character of the Holodomor.
3. Objective research of crimes of the totalitarian Communist ré­
gime in the Soviet Union, including the Great Famine (by a 
very small group of Russian scholars).
14 Peter Borisow, “Holodomor: Metagenocide in Ukraine — Its Origins 
and Why It’s Not Over,” Canadian American Slavic Studies, vol. 42, no. 3 (Fall 
2008), pp. 251-265.
15 Ibid.
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Ideology and politicking
Under this first approach, a majority o f new sources either deny 
the Holodomor at all or bring it into the political context of a new Ukrai­
nian nationalist policy. Among these latest books is Yurii Shevtsov’s 
Новая идеология: Голодомор (New Ideology: Holodomor) which consti­
tutes an extreme Ukrainophobia by the former Director of the Center on 
Problems of European Integration in Minsk. The main idea of this book is 
that the “myth” of the Ukrainian Holodomor is directed against Russia and 
was turned by nationalists into a universal anti-communist ideology for all 
post-communist countries and represents a “re-natzification” of Eastern 
Europe. However, according to reliable sources, the author openly admits 
to having written the book upon official instructions from Moscow.16 17
In the introduction to Новая идеология, Gleb Pavlovsky writes 
about a new Kyiv ideology which “aims at creating a nation —  a victim of 
the Holodomor, whose only goal and the content of whose life will be re­
taliation (призвана воспитать нацию -  жертву Голодомора, целью и 
единственным содержанием жизни которой станет месть).”11 The 
Council of Europe resolution “On International Condemnation of the 
Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Régime,”18 as well as the obligation to 
punish for grave human rights violations under international law, so that 
they do not occur in the future, must be definitely unknown to Pavlovsky.
Shevtsov considers defining the Holodomor as genocide to be a 
myth directed against Russia,19 just a viewpoint o f “Orange” revolutionists 
which they “imposed upon Ukrainian society” (“навязали украинскому 
обществу”),20 an “inevitable concept of Ukrainian nationalists.”21 The 
Holodomor is not treated like a crime that resulted in the death o f millions 
of people but is very cynically called a “totalitarian ideological construc­
tion.”22 Shevtsov’s “hypothesis” for the reasons of the famine —  such as
16 Email from M. T. Znayenko to aaus-list@ukrainianstudies.org on the 
subject of Russian Ukrainophobia on Holodomor. New book (May 14, 2009).
17 Юрий Шевцов, Новая идеология: Голодомор (Moscow: Evropa,
2009).
18 The text of Resolution 1481, “Need for international condemnation of 
crimes of totalitarian communist regimes,” was adopted by the Parliamentary As­
sembly of the Council of Europe on January 25, 2006 (5th Sitting), 
www. assembly, coe. int.
19 Шевцов, pp. 8-9.
20 Ibid., p. 7.
21 Ibid., p. 13.
22 Ibid., p. 11.
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the so-called suicidal behavior of villages themselves and the crisis of vil­
lage culture —  against the background of the International Inquiry Com­
mission Report on the causes of Great Famine23 are, to put it mildly, abso­
lutely absurd and strange.
However the main reason for Shevtsov’s (i.e., Russia’s) fear of the 
“cult of Holodomor” lies in its assisting “Ukraine’s integration into Europe 
— EU and NATO”24 —  and this is what scares Russia most of all. It 
would mean losing Ukraine, like Russia has lost the Baltic States and is 
now losing Georgia. The most cynical statement o f the book is the last: 
that the resistance to the cult of the Holodomor is indeed the protection of 
European values and European civilization. One cannot even criticize such 
a statement —  its lack of common sense places it beyond criticism.
Another Russian historian, R. Medvedev, while not denying that 
Soviet Ukraine has passed through a lot of difficulties, one o f which was 
Famine of 1933,25 stresses that in the winter and spring o f 1933 the famine 
was wide-spread in all the southern regions of the U.S.S.R., including Ka­
zakhstan, the Volga region and Don, and thus was a tragedy in all the grain 
regions and a crime o f the government against the peasants of the whole 
Union. He considers it dishonest to treat the famine as genocide against 
only the Ukrainian people, since the bread, which was collected by the 
powers of Ukraine from towns and villages, went either to cities of 
Ukraine itself or was exported through Odesa to western states.
Medvedev stresses that Ukraine was headed at that time by Vlas 
Chubar, a Ukrainian, and Stanislav Kosior, a Pole, who fulfilled Stalin’s 
orders. Medvedev disagrees that it is Russia which is accused in 1933 
Famine. He notes that already in 1983 there was a monument erected in 
Los Angeles with the inscription “To Ukrainians -  victims of Russian 
communism, victims o f the Holodomor.” In refuting such “nationalistic 
interpretations and demands to the Russian Federation to pay compensa­
tion,” Medvedev cites the weekly “2000,” published in Kyiv, which calls 
the “campaign organized by Victor Yushchenko” to be “dances on the 
bones (плясками на костях)."26
However, President Yushchenko never accused Russia of the 
Holodomor-Genocide against Ukrainians —  but instead cited the Soviet
23 International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in 
Ukraine, Final Report (1990).
24 Шевцов, p. 170.
25 P. А. Медведев, “Из истории Содружества Независимых 
Государств,” Новая и новейшая история, по. 5 (2006), р. 178.
26 “2000” (December 23, 2005); as cited by Medvedev.
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Communist totalitarian régime —  nor demanded compensation. One could 
suggest, though, that Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, should 
take responsibility for the crimes of its government.
A view similar to Medvedev’s is expressed by Boris Piadyshev, 
who notes in his article “Holodomor Politicking” that Yushchenko’s asser­
tion that Moscow created the famine is a desperate move to hide his own 
responsibility for the problems in the country. He contends that evoking 
the issue o f the famine cannot help the situation in any way, and that 
Yushchenko is only politicking.27
Over-exaggerated and not planned
The second category of scholars who investigate the Famine deny 
that its consequences were so crucial, stress the idea of exaggerated con­
clusions of Ukrainian scholars on the Holodomor and deny the genocidal 
character of the Holodomor. They include as arguments a lack of sources 
proving the intent of the government to exterminate the Ukrainian nation. 
“Not a single document exists that even indirectly shows that the strategy 
and tactics chosen for Ukraine differed from those applied to other regions, 
not to mention tactics or strategy with the aim of genocide,” said Vladimir 
Kozlov, head of Russia’s Federal Archive Agency. He stressed that the 
famine was a direct result o f Josef Stalin’s brutal collectivization campaign 
and the widespread confiscation of grain that was exported to secure 
equipment needed for the Soviet dictator’s frenetic industrialization drive. 
Kozlov also mentioned that the policy was class-based, targeting the ku­
laks —  wealthy farmers perceived as enemies of Communism —  and was 
implemented virtually identically across the Soviet Union. “There were no 
national or ethnic undertones,” he told a news conference at the headquar­
ters of state news agency RIA-Novosti.28
The same thought was expressed earlier by Victor Kondrashin and 
Diana Penner, who state in their book Famine: 1932-1933 in Soviet Vil­
lage (on materials o f  Volga region, Don and Kuban), that “evidence that 
the famine of 1932-1933 was thoroughly planned has not yet been estab­
lished and that not a single decree o f the Soviet government and the Cen­
tral Committee of the Communist Party in which there was an order to kill 
with famine a certain number o f Ukrainian or other peasants was found by
27 Boris Piadyshev, “Holodomor Politicking,” International Affairs: A 
Russian Journal o f World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations, vol. 55, 
issue 1 (2009), pp. 69-70.
28 The Ukraine List, no. 432 (June, 17 2009), item 13.
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researchers29 (оценки Голода 1932-1933 годов как тщательно 
спланированного до этого времени не получили документального 
подтверждения, а исследователями не найдено ни единого 
постановления Советского правительства и ЦК партии, в котором 
был бы приказ убить с помощью голода определенное количество 
украинских или иных крестьян.)”. Evidently, it would be naïve to think 
that such a criminal power as the Soviet Union would explicitly issue de­
crees to kill millions of Ukrainian peasants. Yet hundreds of documents 
have been revealed by the Security Service of Ukraine proving that the 
Holodomor was ethnically rooted.
Russian scholars also stress the “over-exaggerated” numbers of 
victims of the famine.30 V. A. Tishkov, Director of the Institute of Ethnol­
ogy and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in his article 
“Demographical ‘holodomors ’,” assigned the cause for such “exaggerated” 
(from his point of view) data on victims of the famine among the Ukrai­
nian population to changes of ethnic identity to the benefits o f the other 
group and to external (trans-state) migrations.31
A handful of objective researchers
There is still a very small group o f Russian scholars who continues 
to objectively research the crimes, including the Great Famine, o f the to­
talitarian Communist régime in the Soviet Union. A. N. Sakharov, while 
analyzing the general problems of historical scholarship in Russia, notes 
investigation of a new topic of “power and society,”32 with research con­
ducted on the basis of recently opened archive documents.33
29 В. Кондрашин i Д. Пеннер, Голод: 1932-1933 годы в советской де­
ревне (наматериалах Поволжья, Дона и Кубани) (Samara: Pensa, 2002), р. 23.
30 В. Н. Смирнов, “Украина в свете современны вызовов глобализа­
ции,” Новая и новейшая история, по. 4 (2008), рр. 26-40.
31 В. А. Тишков, “Демографические ‘голодоморы’,” Родина, по. 7 
(2007), р. 86.
32 А. Н. Сахаров, “Общие проблемы исторической науки. О новых 
подходах в российской исторической науке. 1990-е годы,” История и исто­
рики, no. 1 (2002), рр. 3-28.
33 Голос народа. Письма и отклики рядовых советских граждан о 
событиях 1918-1932 гг. (Moscow, 1998); Общество и власть. 1930-е годы 
(Moscow, 1998); Письма во власть. 1917-1927: Заявления, жалобы, доносы, 
письма в государственные структуры и большевистским вождям. Докумен­
ты советской истории (Moscow, 1998); Советская деревня глазами ВЧК - 
ОГПУ - НКВД. 1918-1939: Документы и материалы. В 4 т. (Moscow, 1998- 
2000); Крестьянские историки: русская деревня 20-х годов в письмах и доку­
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While analyzing Walter Duranty’s activity in describing the fa­
mine in the Soviet Union, Russian historian K. T. Tikhii writes that Duran­
ty’s communications to the New York Times impress by the “Jesuitical” 
nature o f his statements about the absence o f famine in Russia,34 citing 
Duranty’s assertion that “there is only wide spread mortality because of 
diseases caused by malnutrition.”35
Tikhii further writes that another journalist, William Henry Cham­
berlin, travelled in the same places for two weeks and revealed convincing 
evidence of recent famine.36
M. Greenberg in his article “Strengthening of Legality and Strug­
gling with Crime. Criminal Law as a Phenomenon Incompatible with Ille­
gality and Tyranny” —  which turned out to be the only article in the Rus­
sian State and Law that includes the issue of Famine —  characterizes the 
Decrees of the Central Executive Committee and the Council o f People’s 
Deputies of the U.S.S.R. on “Guarding the Property o f State Enterprises, 
Collective Farms and Cooperation and Strengthening of Socialist Proper­
ty” of August 7, 193237 (the so-called “Law of Five Stalks”) as an example 
of criminal law free from principles o f humanity, justice, differentiation 
and individualization of responsibility.38 This Decree foreshadowed judi­
cial repression for the plunder of collective and cooperative properties in 
the form of “execution with the confiscation of all property and substitu­
ментах (Moscow, 2001); Трагедия советской деревни. Коллективизация и 
раскулачивание: Документы и материалы. В 5 т. (Moscow, 1999-2001); “Со­
вершенно секретно”. Лубянка - Сталину: о положении в стране. 1922- 934 гг. 
(Moscow, 2001); Общество и власть. Российская провинция. 1917-1980-е 
годы (По материалам Нижегородских архивов) (Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod, 
Paris, 2002); Ивницкий H. А. Коллективизация и раскулачивание (начало 30-х 
годов) (Moscow, 1996); Рязанская деревня в 1929-1930 гг. Хроника голово­
кружения. Документы и материалы (Moscow, 1998; Иванова Г. М. ГУЛАГ в 
системе тоталитарного государства (Moscow, 1997); Зима В. Ф. Голод в 
СССР 1946-1947 годов: происхождение и последствия (Moscow, 1996).
34 К. Т. Тихий, “Уолтер Дюранти о Советском Союзе: Мифы и 
реальность,” Новая и новейшая история, по. 5 (2008), рр. 210-211.
35 W. Duranty, “Russians Hungry, But Not Starving,” New York Times 
(March 31, 1933).
36 William H. Chamberlin, Russia's Iron Age, pp. 83-84.
37 Собрание законодательства СССР, no. 62 (1932).
38 M. С. Гринберг, “Укрепление законности и борьба с преступнос­
тью. Уголовное право как феномен, несовместимый с бесправием и произ­
волом,” Государство и право, рр. 46-53 (available at www.ebiblioteka.ru/ 
sources/article.jsp?id=5428403).
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tion in lesser cases of the deprivation of freedom for a term of not less than 
10 years with the confiscation of all property.” While it was issued and 
enacted at a time when many regions were suffering from famine, this De­
cree was psychologically and biologically damaging: “постановление 
было непсихологично и, если возможен такой оборот, небиологично - 
не устанавливало и не закрепляло ‘перепад ’ между положением 
законопослушного индивида и положением индивида, нарушающего 
закон. Нацеленный, как любое существо, на самосохранение, индивид 
не мог не предпочесть неизбежной гибели от голода вероятное 
наказание за кражу,”39
Summary
As long as the present régime exists in Russia, the obligation un­
der international law to investigate the crimes of the totalitarian Soviet sys­
tem, including the Great Famine of 1932-1933, and to punish those re­
sponsible is not likely to be fulfilled.
In stark contrast to Russia, former Ukrainian President Yushchen­
ko’s efforts in commemorating the victims of the Holodomor, as well as 
the researches of Ukrainian historians, political scientists, demographers 
and lawyers, have gone so far that they cannot be curtailed or stopped. 
Ukraine persistently paves the way to ascertaining the fact of the Holodo­
mor in the courts and to recognizing it as a crime of genocide on the inter­
national level. In May 2009, the Security Service o f Ukraine opened crim­
inal procedures on the fact o f the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine. More 
than 130 persons are indicted in instigating and committing this crime; 
although none of them is alive, the very fact of the accusations is impor­
tant.
In January 2010, the Appeals Court of Kyiv ascertained that the 
leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Communist 
Party of Ukraine, including Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kos- 
sior, Chubar and Khatayevich, deliberately organized genocide on the part 
of the Ukrainian national group, with the purpose of suppressing the na­
tional liberation movement in Ukraine and preventing the restoration and 
consolidation of an independent Ukrainian State, by creating conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its destruction through the Holodomor of 
1932-1933 which resulted at the destruction o f three million nine hundred 
and forty-one thousand people.
39 Ibid., p. 51.
